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Abstract 
Globalisation, deregulation, logistics integration and containerisation have reshaped the port and 
shipping industry. Port and maritime companies are challenged to redefine their functional role in 
the value chain for the sake of creating customer value and of ensuring the survival and growth of 
the company. Companies are busily trying to disrupt the status quo rather than preserve it. Based on 
empirical evidence, this paper demonstrates that because of the rapidly changing environment the 
port and liner shipping markets are not stable any longer. Individual terminal operators and shipping 
lines tend to walk different paths on a quest for higher margins and increased customer satisfaction. 
And more than once they (have to) change paths. 
1 Introduction 
The market environment in which container ports and shipping lines are operating is 
substantially changing. One of the main driving forces to change emerges from the 
globalisation process and the large-scale adoption of the container since the late 1960s. 
Worldwide container port throughput increased from 36 million TEU1 in 1980 to 266 
million TEU in 2002. Forecasts point to between 432 and 468 million TEU in 2010 (OSC, 
1997 and OSC, 2003). While the Atlantic Rim is the cradle of containerisation, 
economically dynamic East Asia has become the world’s main container region. The share 
of Asia in worldwide container port throughput rose from 25 per cent in 1980 to about 46 
per cent now, while Europe saw its share drop from 32 per cent to 23 per cent.  
The rise of world containerisation is the result of the interplay of macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and policy-oriented factors. World trade is facilitated through the 
elimination of trade barriers and the liberalisation and deregulation of markets. Practical 
evidence shows that the public sector has redefined its role in the port and shipping 
industries through privatisation and corporatisation schemes. Contemporary government 
intervention in an efficiency-oriented industry typically focuses on the issue of market 
liberalisation and the creation of a level playing field for fair competition, the monopoly 
issue and the public goods issue (see Goss, 1990; Baird, 2000; De Monie, 1995; 
Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001 and Everett, 1996). With the reassessment of the role of 
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1 TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit, a standard container with a length of 20’. 
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the government much attention is now paid to governance issues in ports and shipping (see 
Brooks, 2001 and Wang, 2003). 
Market liberalisation revealed to enhance the development of logistics throughout the 
world. International supply chains have become complex and logistics models evolve 
continuously as a result of influences and factors such as the globalisation and expansion 
into new markets, mass customisation in response to product and market segmentation, 
lean manufacturing practices and associated shifts in costs. Customers’ need for a wider 
array of global services and for truly integrated services and capabilities (design, build and 
operate) triggered integrated logistics strategies (Christopher, 1992 and McKinnon, 2001) 
and a shift from transportation-based 3PLs (Third Party Logistics) to warehousing and 
distribution providers and at the same time opened the market to innovative forms of non-
asset related logistics service provision, that is 4PL (Fourth Party Logistics)2.  
Intensified competition at the supply side creates pressures on cost management and on 
margins. The evolutions in supply chains and logistics models urge container ports and 
shipping lines to re-think their function in the logistics process. Recent literature has 
addressed the impact of changes in logistics on the functional role of ports and shipping in 
value chains. Robinson (2002) places the role of seaports within a new paradigm of ports 
as elements in value-driven chain systems. Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001b) and 
Heaver et al (2000) primarily discussed the changing role of port authorities in the new 
logistic-restructured environment, while Martin and Thomas (2001) addressed structural 
changes in the container terminal community. Slack et al (2002) demonstrates how the 
organisational restructuring of the container shipping industry is taking place against the 
backdrop of logistics.  
This paper aims to provide an overview of the challenges facing port and maritime 
companies in an ever-changing competitive environment. Based on empirical evidence, the 
paper analyses the paths shipping lines and terminal operating companies are walking in 
the hope to face the ongoing dynamics in the highly competitive container and logistics 
markets in a sustainable manner.   
2 How do container shipping lines cope with the changing market 
environment ? 
2.1 Instability in liner shipping 
In the first ten years of containerisation lines rarely had to worry about profitability. 
Consortia managed service patterns and capacity for specific trade routes and powerful 
liner conferences3 looked after freight rates, that is through revenue pooling agreements 
2 Whereas a 3PL service provider typically invests in warehouses and transport material, a 4PL service 
provider restricts its scope to IT-based supply chain design. Consultants and IT shops help 3PLs and 4PLs to 
expand into new markets and to become full-service logistics providers. 
3 A liner conference is defined by Unctad’s Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences 
(Chapter 1) as ‘a group of two or more vessel-operating carriers which provides international liner services 
for the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes within specified geographical limits and which has 
an agreement or arrangement, what-ever its nature, within the framework of which they operate under 
uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provision of liner 
services.’  
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based on conference tariffs. These structures endured until the middle of the 1980s when 
non-conference operator Evergreen began to challenge the existing situation. 
Over the last decade container carriers have significantly under performed financially 
compared to other industries. The weaker performance can be related to the combination of 
the capital-intensive operation and the high risks associated with the revenues. Shipping 
remains a very capital-intensive industry where some assets are owned and other are leased 
and there exists a wide variability in cost bases. These explain the short-term instability in 
the industry (Brooks, 2000).  
Economic forces tend to push freight rates down. Economies of scale lead to surplus 
space onboard of the vessels that lines are eager to fill. Existing slot overcapacity in some 
trades made freight rates tumble down, neutralizing the achieved cost reductions. A lot of 
carriers ended up with smaller margins and lower return on investment. The carrier will 
reach a reasonable profitability when trade volume is close to or exceeds the capacity 
provided. Controlling capacity to match demand seems logical, but hard to accomplish. 
Lines vie for market share and capacity tends to be added as additional loops, that is in 
large chunks. Capacity management remains very challenging until this fragmented 
industry looks more like an oligopoly. The boom in the Asia trades in 1999-2000 followed 
by a decline in 2001-2002 provides a good illustration. Capacity in the boom was very 
highly utilised. Soaring demand made shipping lines to implement large rate increases in 
these trades against only token resistance by shippers. When trade growth began to turn 
down, an event that unfortunately coincided with the introduction of new tonnage, the 
position went swiftly into reverse.  
Lines operate regular, reliable and frequent services and incur high fixed costs. Once 
the large and expensive networks are set up, the pressure is on to fill them with freight. The 
simple observation that unused capacity cannot be stored and used later further increases 
the pressure to go for volume. In order to secure cargo, shipping lines have negotiated 
long-term contracts with shippers, however the risk balance in these contracts resides at the 
carrier side. In an environment of overcapacity, high fixed costs and product perishability, 
lines will chase short run contribution filling containers at a marginal cost only approach, 
often leading to direct operational losses on the trades considered. 
Rate erosion would not be that bad if changes in freight prices had a major impact on 
demand. Unfortunately, for most shipments freight revenue only accounts for a very small 
portion of the shipment’s total value, but as carriers cannot influence the size of the final 
market, they will try to increase their short run market share by reducing prices. As such, 
shipping lines may reduce freight rates without substantially affecting the underlying 
demand for container freight.  
Rather inelastic demand curves are the core problem for liner profitability and are at 
the heart of liner strategy. Lines have come to accept that they have to take whatever price 
is offered in the market. This acceptance has, in turn, led to intense concentration on costs. 
2.2 Sca le increases in vessel size 
Throughout the 1990s a great deal of attention was devoted to larger, more fuel-economic 
vessels and this indeed produced substantial reductions in cost per TEU of capacity 
provided (table 1). Larger ships typically have a lower cost per TEU-mile than smaller 
units with the same load factor. Samsung demonstrated that a vessel of 12000 TEU on the 
Europe – Far East route would generate a 11 per cent cost saving per container slot 
compared to a 8000 TEU vessel and even 23 per cent compared to a 4000 TEU unit. 
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Similar calculations made by Drewry for the trans-Pacific route point to potential cost 
differences of around 50 per cent between a panamax unit of 4000 TEU and a mega post-
panamax unit of 10000 TEU (Drewry, 2001). Cullinane et al (1999) have demonstrated 
that economies of scale for the trans-Pacific and Europe – Far East routes are enjoyed at 
ship sizes beyond 8000 TEU, even if one considers different scenarios as regards port 
productivity. The optimal size for the trans-Atlantic liner route would range between 5000 
and 6000 TEU.  
Table 1: Scale increases in vessel size: evolution of the world cellular fleet 1991-2006  
Note: Projection at January 2006 as compiled with existing fleet and order book as at 15 June 2003 
Source: BRS Alphaliner Fleet Report, September 2003  
However, there are several reasons why a unilateral focus of carriers on vessel sizes 
does not lead to a more stable market environment.  
First of all, the economies of scale did not necessarily translate into reductions in cost 
per TEU carried. Hence, overall vessel and voyage costs have been increased dramatically 
in order to establish competitive networks satisfying the global requirements of the 
shippers.  Carriers need a lot of vessels of similar size to ensure a weekly departure at each 
port of call (that is 12 vessels for a pendulum service Europe –Far East – US West Coast, 8 
vessels for a Europe – Far East service and 4 to 5 vessels for a trans-Atlantic service). 
Upgrading the vessel size on a specific route takes several years and demands huge 
investments.  
Secondly, given that there seem to be no technical reasons preventing containerships 
from getting larger, it will be economic and operational considerations that will act as the 
ultimate barrier on post-panamax vessel sizes and designs of the future. Although some 
shipping lines are now looking into the possibility of deploying vessels of more than 9,000 
TEU, it is expected that this vessel size will not become the general rule in the next 10 
years. There are strong indications that the range of 5,500 to 6,500 TEU will reveal to be 
the most competitive vessel size for the time being as these ships offer more flexibility in 
terms of the number of potential ports of call and consequently the direct access to specific 
regional markets.     
Thirdly, the recent scale enlargement in vessel size has reduced the slot costs in 
container trades, but carriers have not reaped the full benefits of economies of scale at sea 
(Lim, 1998). Poorer slot utilization and the need to go out and buy more cargo at lower 
Jan 1991 Shares Jan 1996 Shares Jan 2001 Shares Jan 2006 Shares
>5000 TEU 0 0.0% 30648 1.0% 621855 12.7% 2355033 30.0%
4000/4999 TEU 140032 7.5% 428429 14.4% 766048 15.6% 1339978 17.1%
3000/3999 TEU 325906 17.6% 612377 20.6% 814713 16.6% 892463 11.4%
2000/2999 TEU 538766 29.0% 673074 22.6% 1006006 20.5% 1391216 17.7%
1500/1999 TEU 238495 12.8% 367853 12.3% 604713 12.3% 719631 9.2%
1000/1499 TEU 329578 17.7% 480270 16.1% 567952 11.6% 596047 7.6%
500/999 TEU 191733 10.3% 269339 9.0% 393744 8.0% 438249 5.6%
100/499 TEU 92417 5.0% 117187 3.9% 132472 2.7% 114976 1.5%
TOTAL 1856927 100.0% 2979177 100.0% 4907503 100.0% 7847593 100.0%
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rates can have a profound impact on carriers’ revenues and lead to lower profitability. The 
ultra-large container ships can be deployed efficiently on the major trade lanes, provided 
they are full. However, many carriers have not been able to realize a continuous high 
utilization of available slot capacity on their bigger vessels. Unpredictable business cycles 
on the major trade lanes result in unstable cargo guarantees to shipping lines (even if 
service contracts are quite common).  
Fierce price competition leaves the entire liner shipping industry worse off in terms of 
profitability. Graham (1998) rightly stated that cost cutting practices through consecutive 
rounds of post-panamax newbuildings is not helping to reach stability in liner shipping. 
The danger of enhancing a vicious cycle towards further scale increases, overbuilding and 
falling margins is eminently clear. Adding post-panamax capacity can give a short-term 
competitive edge to the early mover, putting pressure on the followers in the market to 
upgrade their container fleet and to avert a serious unit cost disadvantage. A boomerang 
effect eventually also hurts the carrier who started the price war. 
2.3 Co-operation, mergers and acquisitions  
The further decrease in unit cost per TEU-mile can only be achieved safely - that is 
without enhancing destructive competition - by combining the deployment of bigger 
vessels with an organisational scale increase (Chinnery, 1999). Horizontal integration in 
liner shipping comes in three forms: trade agreements such as liner conferences, operating 
agreements (that is vessel sharing agreements, slot chartering agreements, consortia and 
strategic alliances) and mergers and acquisitions. The top 20 carriers controlled 26 per cent 
of the world slot capacity in 1980, 41.6 per cent in 1992 and about 58 per cent on 2003 
(see also table 2). More important than which carriers are in the top 20 is the fact that only 
few container carriers outside the top 20 operate post-panamax vessels4 and that most of 
the top 20 carriers are involved in multi-trade strategic alliances.  
Figure 1 underlines the dynamics in strategic alliance formation and in mergers and 
acquisitions in liner shipping ( P&O Nedlloyd in 1997, Maersk SeaLand in 1999). The 
long list of acquisitions of CP Ships (that is Lykes Lines, TMM, etc.) is not included. The 
economic rationality for mergers and acquisitions is rooted in the objective to size, growth, 
economies of scale, market share and market power. Other motives for mergers and 
acquisitions in liner shipping relate to gaining instant access to markets and distribution 
networks, obtaining access to new technologies or diversifying. Acquisitions typically 
feature some pitfalls, certainly in the highly international maritime industry: cultural 
differences, overestimated synergies and expense of acquisition. Still, acquisitions make 
sense in liner shipping as the maritime industry is mature and the barriers to entry are 
relatively high (due to investment volumes required and customer base development). It 
provides an alternative when a shipping line is unwilling to accept the costs and risks of 
entering new venturing.  
4 A post-panamax vessel is a vessel too large to pass through the Panama Canal. The critical maximum vessel 
dimensions on the Panama Canal are 32.31 m wide, 294.13 m length overall (LOA) and a draft of 12.04 m. 
These maximum dimensions are based on the capacity of existing lock systems.  
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Table 2: Slot capacity operated by the top twenty carriers 
Source: compiled from BRS Alphaliner and Containerisation International. 
Figure 1: M&A and strategic alliances on the trade Europe – Far East (Source: ITMMA-
UA) 
Note: the main mergers and acquisitions are shown on this figure by the joining arrows 
Co-operation is likely to be advantageous when the combined costs of operations or 
buying transactions (such as negotiating and contracting) are lower than the cost of 
January 1980 September 1995 January 2000 April 2003
Carrier Slot cap. Carrier Slot cap. Carrier Slot cap. Carrier Slot cap.
1 Sea-Land 70000 Sea-Land 196708 Maersk - SeaLand 620324 Maersk - SeaLand 845614
2 Hapag-Lloyd 41000 Maersk 186040 Evergreen 317292 MSC 470006
3 OCL 31400 Evergreen 181982 P&O Nedlloyd 280794 Evergreen group 427749
4 Maersk 25600 COSCO 169795 Hanjin/DSR Senator 244636 P&O Nedlloyd 410990
5 NYK Line 24000 NYK Line 137018 MSC 224620 Hanjin/DSR Senator 288957
6 Evergreen 23600 Nedlloyd 119599 NOL/APL 207992 NOL/APL 250018
7 OOCL 22800 Mitsui OSK Lines 118208 COSCO 198841 COSCO 243162
8 Zim 21100 P&OCL 98893 NYK Line 166206 CMA/CGM 237115
9 US Line 20900 Hanjin Shipping 92332 CP Ships / Americana 141419 NYK Line 220600
10 APL 20000 MSC 88955 Zim 136075 CP Ships group 196938
11 Mitsui OSK Lines 19800 APL 81547 Mitsui OSK Lines 132618 K-Line 186805
12 Farrell Lines 16400 Zim 79738 CMA/CGM 122848 Mitsui OSK Lines 166635
13 NOL 14800 K-Line 75528 K-Line 112884 Zim 166611
14 Trans Freight Line 13900 DSR-Senator 75497 Hapag-Lloyd 102769 China Shipping 166213
15 CGM 12700 Hapag-Lloyd 71688 Hyundai 102314 OOCL 156173
16 Yang Ming 12700 NOL 63469 OOCL 101044 Hapag Lloyd 152937
17 Nedlloyd 11700 Yang Ming 60034 Yang Ming 93348 Yang Ming 136236
18 Columbas Line 11200 Hyundai 59195 China Shipping 86335 Hyundai 125474
19 Safmarine 11100 OOCL 55811 UASC 74989 CSAV 114189
20 Ben Line 10300 CMA 46026 Wan Hai 70755 Hamburg-Sud 111955
Slot capacity top 20 435000 2058063 3538103 5074377
C4-index 38.6% 35.7% 41.4% 42.5%
Share top 5 in top 20 44.1% 42.3% 47.7% 48.2%
Share top 10 in top 20 69.1% 67.5% 71.7% 70.8%
Situation May 1994 Situation May 1996 Situation March 1998 Situation end 2003
Alliances and consortia
GLOBAL ALLIANCE: NEW WORLD ALLIANCE: NEW WORLD ALLIANCE:
APL APL/NOL APL/NOL
Mitsui OSK Lines Mitsui OSK Lines Mitsui OSK Lines
Nedlloyd Nedlloyd            100% Hyundai Hyundai
CGM OOCL
MISC MISC
GRAND ALLIANCE: GRAND ALLIANCE II: GRAND ALLIANCE II:
Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd Hapag-Lloyd
NYK Line NYK Line NYK Line NYK Line
Mitsui OSK Lines NOL P&O Nedlloyd P&O Nedlloyd
P&OCL OOCL OOCL
MISC MISC
Maersk Maersk Maersk Maersk SeaLand
P&OCL Sea-Land Sea-Land
Hyundai Hyundai MSC MSC
Sea-Land MSC Norasia Norasia
Norasia Norasia
Hanjin UNITED ALLIANCE: Hanjin-CYK group:
Tricon-consortium: 75% Hanjin (incl. DSR-Senator) Hanjin (incl. DSR-Senator)
- DSR Senator Cho Yang K-Line
ACE-consortium: - Cho Yang UASC Yang Ming
K-Line K-Line CYK ALLIANCE: COSCO
NOL Yang Ming K-Line
OOCL Yang Ming
COSCO
Main outsiders
Evergreen Evergreen Evergreen (1) Evergreen (1)
UASC UASC UASC (2)
COSCO COSCO
Cho Yang went bankrupt
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operating alone. Co-operation between carriers serves as a means to secure economies of 
scale, to achieve critical mass in the scale of operation and to spread the high level of risk 
associated with investments in ships (Ryoo and Thanopoulou, 1999 and Slack et al, 2002). 
Carriers are viewing market mass as one of the most effective weapons in coping with a 
trade environment that is characterized by intense pricing pressure. Alliances provide its 
members easy access to more loops or services with relative low cost implications and 
allow them to share terminals, to co-operate in many areas at sea and ashore, thereby 
achieving costs savings in the end. Midoro and Pitto (2000) and Graham (1998) argue that 
despite these advantages of alliance formation, strategic alliances in itself have not become 
a stabilizing factor in liner shipping due to the organizational complexity of the alliance 
and perceived intra-alliance competition that undermines trust between carriers involved. 
Mergers and acquisitions have reduced the number of partners in alliances (figure 1), but 
the lack of differentiation of the partners’ roles and the absence of co-ordination of 
marketing and sales still prevent the alliance structure from playing a key role in the 
alleviation of market instability.  
2.4 Landside logistics as a revenue base, cost control centre and a 
source of differentiation 
In a shipping industry already dominated by large vessels, mergers/acquisitions and 
strategic alliances the potential cost savings at sea still left are getting smaller and the 
pressure to find cost savings elsewhere is growing. Inland logistics is one of the most vital 
areas still left to cut costs. More economical ships and alliance co-operation have lowered 
ship system costs, but at the same time intermodal costs share an increasing part of the 
total cost. In a typical intermodal transport, inland transport now accounts for a much 
larger component of the cost than running the vessel. The portion of inland costs in the 
total costs of container shipping would range from 40 per cent to 80 per cent. For instance, 
Hastings (1997) reports that the inland costs for CP Ships account for 42 per cent of its 
overall costs or even 50 per cent if the repositioning of empty containers is included. For 
P&O Nedlloyd inland transportation would account for 70 per cent of total cost.  
The shift of balance from vessel costs to landside costs is enhanced by transport price 
evolutions. Overcapacity keeps a limit on ocean pricing, while inland pricing is much more 
cost-driven. As such, cost increases in inland moves tend to pass through to price levels 
more easily compared to ocean moves, thereby increasing the absolute difference between 
both items. In general the price difference per TEU-km between inland transport and long-
haul liner shipping ranges from a factor 5 to a factor 30, further supporting the case 
tackling inland costs5.      
Besides cost and revenue considerations, the demand pull force of the market is a main 
driving force for carriers to integrate their services along the supply chain. Shippers take 
the global coverage of liner services for granted. What is now focused on is carrier’s 
ability to deliver integrated services. Carriers have to meet shippers’ requirements in terms 
5 For instance, the freight rates on a port-to-port basis between North Europe and the Far East amount to 
some $ 0.045 per TEU-km (based on a freight rate of $ 800 and a route length of 10000nm, THC and 
additional adjustment factors not included), while inland haulage per truck from north European ports 
usually ranges from $ 0.8 to $ 2 per TEU-km on an average. By barge the route Antwerp-Emmerich (190 
km) costs about $ 90 per TEU or $ 0.5 per TEU-km (including handling cost and port dues at inland 
terminal, but without pre- and endhaul by truck or seaport terminal costs - figures based on CCS Tariff 
Information System). On longer distances, unit prices per TEU-km for barging are slightly lower. 
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of frequency, punctuality, reliability and geographical coverage (Slack et al, 1996). The 
increasingly complex distribution requirements of the customers create significant 
opportunities for shipping lines. Carriers that have traditionally been concerned only with 
the transportation of goods from one point to another are now seeking logistics businesses 
in the area of just-in-time inventory practices, supply chain integration and logistics 
information system management. With only a few exceptions, however, the management 
of pure logistics services is done by subsidiaries that share the same mother company as 
the shipping line but operate independently of liner shipping operations, and as such also 
ship cargo on competitor lines (Heaver, 2002).  
Some shipping lines such as Maersk Sealand have gone rather far in door-to-door 
services and integrated logistic packages (that is Maersk Logistics), managing the 
container terminal operation (that is APM Terminals with a network of dedicated terminals 
that has been opened to third users as well) and inland transport (for example European 
Rail Shuttle in joint venture with P&O Nedlloyd6) and bypassing the freight forwarder by 
developing direct relationships with the shipper. Other shipping lines stick to the shipping 
business and try to enhance network integration through structural or ad hoc co-ordination 
with independent inland transport operators and logistics service providers. A last group of 
shipping lines combines a strategy of selective investments in key supporting activities (for 
example agency services or distribution centres) with sub-contracting of less critical 
services. Shipping lines generally do not own inland transport equipment. Instead they 
tempt to use trustworthy independent inland operators’ services on a (long-term) contract 
base (see Konings, 1993; Baird and Lindsay, 1996; Graham, 1998; Cariou, 2001; 
Evangelista and Morvillo, 1998 and Heaver, 2002). 
Carriers are confronted with some important barriers to further improve inland 
logistics. Landside operations are management intensive and generally involve a high 
proportion of bought-in services. Customer requirements and behaviour often impede 
carriers from minimizing inland logistics costs. Late bookings for example are costly, 
because instead of going by train or barge, they must go by truck to catch the ship, for no 
extra revenue. Moreover, inland movements generate some under-remunerated activities 
such as the repositioning of empty units, network control and tracking. Other important 
barriers relate to volume and equipment-type of imbalances, (unforeseen) delays in ports 
and the inland transport leg as well as the uncertainty of forecasts. Carriers are using IT 
solutions to face the challenges in inland logistics and to manage global container flows 
taking into account the effects of global trade imbalances. Moreover, they have learned to 
lessen equipment surpluses/deficits through container cabotage, inter-line equipment 
interchanges, chassis pools and master leases7. Equipment interchange agreements are 
often, but not always, maintained among some liner conference members and some 
6 ERS operates shuttle trains mainly out of the port of Rotterdam to inland destinations in the Benelux, 
Germany, Poland, Italy, Belgium, the Czech republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Started at 3 shuttles a week in 
1994 ERS now offers 200+ shuttles a week (Van Slobbe, 2002). ERS demonstrates the aim of a number of 
shipping lines to jointly develop intermodal shuttles on routes where the existing rail products lack a good 
price-quality relation. Only few deepsea carriers are directly involved in inland navigation. Typically, barge 
services are maintained by independent barge operators (Charlier and Ridolfi, 1994). 
7 Container cabotage makes it possible to considerably cut the costs related to the repositioning of empty 
containers: carriers will build up relationships with inland transport operators which move their equipment to 
where it is needed free of charge. In return the inland operator gets free one-way use of the box. Master 
leases allow carriers to pick up/drop off equipment at will, placing the repositioning problem to the leasing 
company. The pick up/drop off charges reflect imbalances. 
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members of the same strategic alliance (for example New World Alliance). So-called ‘grey 
box’ agreements are quite rare: the concept has not proven workable partly because many 
carriers attach too much attention to company branding via the equipment used.  
The formation of global alliances has taken inter-carrier co-operation to new heights, 
with members sharing inland logistics information, techniques and resources as well as 
negotiating collectively with suppliers (terminals, rail operators, feeders, barge operators, 
etc.). By extending to the landside, alliances clearly differ from older forms of operating 
agreements.  
Shipping lines and alliances seek to increase the percentage of carrier haulage on the 
European continent. The share of carrier haulage presently is about 30 per cent on an 
average, but large differences can be observed among routes and regions (MDS 
Transmodal, 1998). A few carriers have succeeded in attaining a high level of carrier 
haulage. For instance, P&O Nedlloyd had a carrier haulage percentage in Europe of 49% 
in 2002 compared to 45.4 per cent in 1999 (Van Slobbe, 2002). Some other carriers with 
less experience or interest in European inland transport control less then 10 per cent of 
inland container movements. If the inland leg is based on merchant haulage than the carrier 
loses control of and information on its boxes. Carriers are not eager to impose financial 
penalties for clients that hold boxes too long, as they fear of upsetting and maybe losing 
the customer.  
Carriers have very little room to increase the income out of inland logistics. If the 
carrier haulage tariffs edge above the open market rates, the merchant haulage option 
might become more attractive. The resulting competitive pressures partly explain the weak 
level of price contention between carrier and customer when it comes to charges in the 
inland leg.  
Liner conferences such as TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) have tried to 
install shared fixing of intermodal inland rates. The European Commission opposes to such 
practices and decided that the broad block exemption from the usual ban on restrictive 
agreements given to traditional maritime liner conferences (Council Regulation no. 
4056/86) cannot be broadened to include inland operations.  
Inland and container logistics thus constitute an important field of action to shipping 
lines. Lines that are successful in achieving cost gains from smarter management of inland 
and container logistics can secure an important cost savings advantage. Moreover, because 
this is difficult to do, it is likely to be a sustainable way of differentiating business from 
rivals.  
2.5 Changes in liner service network design 
2.5.1 Limits to the hub-and-spoke principle 
In the last two decades increased cargo availability has made carriers and alliances to 
reshape their liner shipping networks through the introduction of new types of end-to-end 
services and pendulum services, especially on the main east-west trade lanes. Pendulum 
services rely on hub ports that act as turntables between liner services of two different 
trades and that are served by post-panamax vessels. This kind of liner service design has 
become popular on high-volume international trade routes such as the trade Europe-Far 
East- US West coast.  As a result the last decade has seen the emergence of a new breed of 
load centres along the east-west shipping lanes. These sites rely heavily sometimes 
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completely on traffic flows that are distantly generated by the interaction of widely 
separated places and stimulated by the port’s en route location or intermediacy. 
Much literature has addressed the issue of the hub-feeder system versus direct port 
calls at continental ports. Some have suggested that the most efficient east/west pattern is 
the equatorial round-the-world, following the beltway of the world (cf. Ashar 2002 and De 
Monie, 1997). This service pattern focuses on a hub and spokes system of ports that allows 
shipping lines to provide a global grid of east/west, north/south and regional services. The 
large ships on the east/west routes will call mainly at transhipment hubs where containers 
will be shifted to multi-layered feeder subsystems serving north/south, diagonal and 
regional routes.  
Liner service network design tends to move from a pure cost-driven exercise to a more 
customer-oriented differentiation exercise, as the optimal network design is not only a 
function of carrier-specific operational factors, but more and more of shippers’ needs (for 
transit time and other service elements) and of shippers’ willingness to pay for a better 
service. A pattern with the biggest ships possible on high-speed operations between a 
reduced number of hubs could be interesting from a pure liner network cost perspective, 
but it has not yet occurred in practice, partly because of customer needs. Hence, the more 
cost efficient the network becomes from a carrier’s perspective, the less convenient that 
network could be for the shippers’ needs in terms of frequency and flexibility. The reality 
of deepsea operations is that even the largest ships operate on multi-port itineraries. 
Alliances and consolidation have created multi-string networks on the major trade routes 
and both shippers and liners are used to it. The multi-loop system of the alliances seems to 
offer a higher sailing frequency than the single loop-single carrier system. A system of 
more loops with smaller vessels bears less risk and could therefore eventually turn out to 
be a cheaper option than running very large vessels on only few loops.  
The future spatial development of liner schedules will largely depend on the balance of 
power between carriers and shippers8. The higher the bargaining power of shippers vis-à-
vis carriers the more pressure for direct calls as this will shift the “cargo follows ship” 
principle to the “ship follows cargo” principle. Carriers are in the process of reviewing 
their strategy with respect to liner shipping networks. As liner service network design has 
become a more customer-oriented differentiation exercise, this could very well introduce a 
tendency towards less transhipment and more direct port of calls (even for the bigger 
vessels). Gilman (1999) and Robinson (1998) rightly pointed out that the networks 
operated by large vessels will continue to be based on end-to-end services. Hub-and-spoke 
systems are just a part of the overall scene. 
2.5.2 Global coverage 
Notwithstanding existing leader-follower strategies in liner service design, large 
differences can be observed among container carriers when it comes to the global coverage 
of liner services (Slack et al, 2001).  
8 The attractiveness of the sea-sea hub-and-spoke network to a carrier also partly depends on the actor who
will bear the transhipment costs. In the current market environment shippers typically bear these costs via 
extra THC (Brooks, 2000). Terminal Handling Charges (THC) can be defined as a tariff, charged by the 
shipping line to the shipper and which (should) cover (part or all of) the terminal handling costs, which the 
shipping line pays to the terminal operator (Dynamar, 2003). This aspect in the balance of power between 
shippers and carriers increases the cost advantages of the hubbing option from a carrier’s perspective, but 
may render a hub-and-spoke configuration uncompetitive from a shipper’s perspective.    
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Frémont and Soppé (2003) demonstrate that the alliances mentioned in figure 1 deploy 
almost 90 per cent of their weekly slot capacity within the triad East Asia, North America 
and Europe. They have hardly any presence on the secondary routes. Alliances clearly try 
to build strongholds on the routes they are present and leave other routes to others. This 
allows the realisation of economies of scale and scope in a global triad-based network.  
Notwithstanding the customers’ push for global services, a large number of individual 
carriers typically remain regionally based, offering the bulk of their services on a limited 
number of trade routes. Asian carriers such as APL, Hanjin, NYK, China Shipping and 
HMM typically focus on intra-Asian trade, transpacific trade and the Europe – Far East 
route, partly because of their huge dependence on export flows generated by their Asian 
home bases. MOL and Evergreen are among the few exceptions frequenting secondary 
routes such as Africa and South-America. As their individual market shares on these 
highly competitive triad routes generally are very low, the former carriers lack leadership 
role in the market and undergo the full effect of market fluctuations. Many of these carriers 
have allocated 70 to 80 per cent of their slot capacity to a strategic alliance (table 3). The 
alliance structure is crucial to the survival of many of these Asian carriers and open 
windows of opportunities to a broader global coverage and higher frequencies without 
significantly increasing the investment requirements.  
Alliance 
Number of 
ships in the 
alliance 
Total fleet 
(number) %
Slot capacity in 
the alliance 
(TEU) 
Total slot 
capacity %
Grand Alliance 
P&O 39 146 26.7 182 550 386 901 47.2 
OOCL 24 50 48.0 119 391 156 016 76.5 
Hapag Lloyd 24 38 63.2 115 449 141 717 81.5 
NYK 24 67 35.8 96 436 167 001 57.7
MISC 4 32 12.5 16 622 49 808 33.4 
Cosco/K-Line/Yangming Alliance
Cosco 38 104 36.5 154 892 219 324 70.6 
K-Line 31 58 53.4 135 205 174 945 77.3 
Yangming 16 40 40.0 72 867 119 695 60.9
New World Alliance 
APL 39 76 51.3 177 100 240 237 73.7 
Hyundai 18 31 58.1 99 158 121 890 81.4
Mitsui OSK 16 48 33.3 77 410 130 090 59.5 
United Alliance 
Hanjin 32 52 61.5 139 205 201 005 69.3 
Senator 28 32 87.5 97 566 104 895 93.0
Table 3: The participation of shipping lines in strategic alliances (early 2003) 
Source: on the basis of Containerisation International and carrier information 
Maersk Sealand, MSC, CMA-CGM and P&O Nedlloyd are among the truly global 
liner operators, with a strong presence also in secondary routes. Especially Maersk Sealand 
has created a balanced global coverage of liner services. The networks of CMA-CGM and 
MSC differ from the general scheme of traffic circulation through a network of specific 
hubs (many of these hubs are not among the world’s biggest container ports) and a more 
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selective serving of secondary markets such as Africa (strong presence by MSC), the 
Caribbean and the East Mediterranean.  
The above reveals the profound differences in service design among shipping lines. 
Some carriers have clearly opted for a true global coverage, others are somewhat stuck in a 
triad-based service network forcing them to develop a strong focus on cost bases. In these 
cases, strategic alliances reveal to be instrumental for the creation of differentiating service 
attributes vis-à-vis rivals and for creating customer value.               
3 How do container port operators cope with the changing market 
environment ? 
3.1 Challenges faced by container port operators 
The terminal and stevedoring industry is confronted with bigger and fewer shipping lines 
demanding more for less. Shipping lines exert growing demands in terms of terminal 
productivity, priority servicing and flexibility, while at the same time insisting on getting 
landside costs down (Notteboom, 2002). 
The loyalty of a port client cannot be taken for granted. Terminal operators face the 
constant risk of losing important clients, not because of deficiencies in port infrastructure 
or terminal operations, but because the client has rearranged its service networks or has 
engaged in new partnerships with other carriers (Slack et al, 1996).  Terminal operators 
face competition from new entrants, in particular from container carriers, railway 
companies, logistics companies and investment groups. In Europe for instance, shipping 
lines have recently entered the market via the development of dedicated terminals at major 
load centres (table 4). Dedicated terminals are even more widespread in Asia and North 
America9. Musso et al (2001), Slack and Frémont (2004), Brennan (2002) and Cariou 
(2003) provide a more in-depth analysis on the issue of dedicated terminals. 
9 Drewry Shipping Consultants (2003) collected throughput figures for terminals in which carriers have a 
non-minority shareholding: Evergreen handled 5.7 million TEU worldwide on its terminals in 2002, Cosco 
4.7 million TEU, Hanjin 4.7, APL 4.3, NYK Line 3.5 (including 1.3 million TEU at its subsidiary Ceres 
Terminals), OOCL 3, NOL 2.5, K-Line 2.2, MSC 2.2, Yang Ming 1.3 and Hyundai 1.1 million TEU. 
Container shipping lines approach terminal management in a different way: they seek control over berths 
while other ‘pure’ terminal operating companies manage multi-user facilities. Many of these liner terminals 
offer stevedoring services to third carriers as well thereby creating some hybrid form in between pure 
dedicated facilities and independently operated multi-user facilities. 
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Shipping line Terminals Status 
Maersk 
Sealand 
(via APM 
Terminals) 
APM Terminals Rotterdam (100%) 
North Sea Terminal Bremerhaven (50%) 
Medcenter - Gioia Tauro (10%) 
Muelle Juan Carlos I - Algeciras (100%) 
Aarhus (100%) 
APM Contstanza Terminal (100%) 
In operation since 2000 
In operation 
In operation 
In operation 
In operation 
In operation 
MSC Dedicated terminal Antwerp (joint venture with 
HesseNoordNatie) 
Le Havre (joint-venture with Terminaux De 
Normandie) 
Operational since 2003 
Upgrading in 2004-2005 
Under development 
Hapag-Lloyd Altenwerder Terminal – Hamburg (minority 
stake of 25.1%) 
In operation since 2002 
CP Ships Traffic concentration at P&O Ports’ terminal in 
Antwerp’s Deurganck dock (west side) 
Under construction 
Table 4: Some examples of shipping lines’ direct interest in European terminals 
3.2 The emergence of international terminal networks 
In a response to the concentration trend that is unfolding in container shipping, a number 
of terminal operators have opted for scale increases. This trend is facilitated by the 
privatisation of port activities. The nature of the container handling business – notably its 
high fixed costs and lack of service differentiation (except in terms of location) – in theory 
creates significant opportunities to improve service through co-operation. However, forms 
of operational co-operation in the market do not come easily and most of the time they end 
up in mergers or acquisitions (Notteboom, 2002; Musso et al, 2001; Slack and Frémont, 
2004). 
Many ports around the world are managed based on the landlord concept. Landlord 
port authorities lease the land to private port operators on the basis of long-term concession 
agreements. Port authorities have developed specific bidding procedures to grant 
concessions to the best possible candidates (Goss, 1990). Port authorities can partially 
shape the entry profile of segments of the local port industry through the bidding 
procedures used, for example by including some clauses in the concession agreement that 
should allow the port authority to end the concession in case specific performance 
measures (for example traffic volumes) are not met by the terminal operator after a 
specified period of operation. The move towards transparent and open concession 
procedures results in local terminal operators no longer relying on shelter-based strategies 
for their survival. At the same time it facilitated the local market entry of global players 
with deep pockets and specific know how.   
These global investors base their investment strategy on exhaustive analyses of 
profitability and of operational efficiency. The ability to take firm control is also a key 
issue. Sometimes operators opt for a joint venture with local partners in order to set up 
successful operations within the confines of the local commercial, economic and 
governmental environment. Other criteria include a high level of indigenous cargo and a 
stable political and economic outlook.  
P&O Ports is set to join Hutchison, PSA and APM Terminals at the head of the global 
port operator league table. These companies have established a truly global presence, 
collectively operating in over 90 ports throughout 37 different countries.  
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In particular China now attracts a lot of attention from global terminal operators - see 
Wang (2003) for a detailed discussion - as shipping lines are dedicating higher capacities 
and deploying larger vessels to cope with the increasing Chinese container imports and 
exports, especially relation to the China-Europe trade (Yap et al, 2003). Chinese ports have 
become prominent in the ranking of the world’s largest container ports (table 5).  
Table 5: Container throughput in world container ports (million TEU)   
Notes: (*) total for 47 container ports (port authorities figures); (**) total for Chinese container ports 
featuring in this table (with or without Hong Kong); (***) total for 35 container ports, 2002 is an estimate 
(AAPA figures) 
Source: ITMMA-UA based on statistics Ministry of Communications PRC, AAPA and port authority data 
Pursuing organic growth is generally the lowest risk/lowest reward strategy available 
to container terminal operators. It is only by pursuit of higher risk growth strategies that 
today’s global operators have progressed from being single location/regional players into 
the global market. In developing a global expansion strategy, HPH, PSA Corp, APM 
1985 1990 1995 1998 2000 2002 2003 
Annual growth 
98-02
Container ports with a throughput exceeding 1.7 million TEU in 2002
1 Hong Kong CHINA 2,29 5,10 12,55 14,58 18,10 19,14 20,45 7,8%
2 Singapore Singapore 1,70 5,09 11,85 15,14 17,04 16,94 18,41 3,0%
3 Busan Korea 1,16 2,35 4,50 5,75 7,54 9,54 10,37 16,5%
4 Shanghai CHINA 0,20 0,46 1,53 3,07 5,61 8,61 11,28 45,2%
5 Kaohsiung Taiwan 1,90 3,49 5,05 6,27 7,43 8,49 8,84 8,9%
6 Shenzhen CHINA 0,00 0,03 0,37 2,06 3,99 7,61 10,65 67,4%
7 Rotterdam Netherlands 2,65 3,67 4,79 6,01 6,27 6,52 7,11 2,1%
8 Los Angeles USA 1,10 2,12 2,56 3,38 4,88 6,11 7,18 20,2%
9 Hamburg Germany 1,16 1,97 2,89 3,55 4,25 5,37 6,14 12,9%
10 Antwerpen Belgium 1,24 1,55 2,33 3,27 4,08 4,78 5,54 11,6%
11 Port Klang Malaysia n.a. 0,47 1,13 1,82 3,21 4,53 4,80 37,3%
12 LongBeach USA 1,14 1,60 2,84 4,10 4,60 4,52 4,66 2,6%
13 Dubai Ports Jebel Ali n.a. 0,92 2,07 2,80 3,06 4,19 n.a. 12,4%
14 New York USA 2,37 1,87 2,22 2,52 3,05 3,79 4,40 12,7%
15 Qingdao CHINA 0,00 0,14 0,60 1,21 2,12 3,41 4,24 45,3%
16 Tokyo Japan n.a. 1,56 2,18 2,49 2,90 3,03 3,20 5,3%
17 Bremen Germany 0,99 1,16 1,52 1,81 2,75 2,98 3,19 16,2%
18 Gioia Tauro Italy 0,00 0,00 0,02 2,13 2,65 2,95 3,15 9,7%
19 Manila Philippines n.a. 1,01 1,69 1,85 2,29 2,46 2,55 8,2%
20 Tanjong Priok n.a. 0,64 1,50 1,90 2,77 2,90 n.a. 13,2%
21 Lam Chabang Thailand n.a. n.a. 0,53 1,56 2,11 2,66 3,18 17,6%
22 Tanjung Pelepas Malaysia 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,42 2,67 3,49
23 Jakarta Indonesia n.a. n.a. 1,50 1,90 2,48 2,70 2,76
24 Tianjin CHINA 0,00 0,29 0,70 1,02 1,71 2,41 3,01 34,1%
25 Yokohama 1,33 1,65 2,73 2,06 2,32 2,36 2,47 3,7%
26 Algeciras Spain 0,35 0,55 1,15 1,83 2,01 2,23 2,52 5,5%
27 Guangzhou CHINA 0,00 0,08 0,51 0,85 1,43 2,17 2,76 39,1%
28 Kobe Japan 1,86 2,60 1,46 1,86 2,03 2,38 2,39 7,0%
29 Nhava Sheva 0,00 0,00 0,24 0,67 1,12 1,95 n.a. 47,7%
30 Nagoya Japan n.a. 0,90 1,48 1,43 1,90 1,93 2,05 8,7%
31 Ningbo CHINA 0,00 0,00 0,16 0,35 0,90 1,86 2,76 106,7%
32 Xiamen CHINA 0,00 0,03 0,33 0,65 1,08 1,75 2,33 42,1%
33 Le Havre France 0,57 0,86 0,97 1,32 1,46 1,72 1,98 7,6%
Other Chinese ports
Dalian CHINA 0,00 0,13 0,37 0,53 1,01 1,35 1,68 39,3%
Jingmen CHINA 0,49 0,74
Fuzhou CHINA 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,34 0,48 0,55 175,6%
European port system (*) 12,36 17,00 24,75 35,06 41,20 46,50 8,2%
Chinese mainland, incl. HK (**) 2,49 6,25 17,13 24,38 36,30 48,81 59,71 25,0%
Chinese mainland, excl. HK (**) 0,20 1,15 4,58 9,80 18,20 29,66 39,26 50,7%
North-American port system (***) 11,36 14,99 20,90 25,35 29,73 31,00 5,6%
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Terminals and P&O Ports try to keep a competitive edge by building barriers to prevent 
competitors entering their domains or against them succeeding if they do. These barriers 
are partly based on the building of strongholds in selected ports around the world and on 
advanced know how on the construction and management of container terminals. The scale 
of operations has created deep pockets or substantial surplus resources that allow them to 
withstand an intensive competitive war and that enable them to financially outperform 
rival companies in case of bidding procedures for new terminal operations. The deep 
pockets are used to move resources wherever they are necessary either to preserve their 
own interests or tackle competition. In the current market situation, the global players 
seem to be best placed to meet the high capital requirements to cover initial investments in 
a terminal of a reasonable scale. 
For example, PSA Corporation first built a stronghold at its home base Singapore 
before taking the step towards global scale and coverage. The critical mass and its focused 
strategy at Singapore enabled PSA Corp. to develop exceptional competencies in terminal 
handling. Once the company established itself as an international benchmark, the 
company’s ambitions went global through a mixed strategy of organic growth (new 
terminals) and acquisitions (for example HesseNoordNatie in 2002) backed up by a sound 
financial status. This development was accelerated by increased competition at its 
Singapore terminals, not at the least from newcomer Tanjung Pelepas - Malaysia, and with 
it less opportunities for internal growth.  
Smaller terminal operators have not been successful in neutralising the power of these 
giants. Many of them avoid direct competition by concentrating on market niches, for 
example on the shortsea market. Over the course of the next five years the gap between the 
four largest companies and the remaining global operators (many of which are carrier-
based operators) is therefore set to widen further. By 2008, the top four operators will 
control over one third of total world container port capacity (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 
2003). This figure is set to continue increasing if the current level of acquisition activity 
continues. 
Market concentration is very evident when looking at the regional scale, although 
systems used might differ regionally based on factors embedded in institutional and 
governance aspects that are regionally bound. Slack and Frémont (2004) demonstrate that 
the non-carrier based global terminal operators have not been able to penetrate the North 
American stevedoring market, while at the same time they have expanded business 
considerably in Asia and Europe. A lack of liberalisation in the port sector, dock labour 
problems and a strong preference towards liner-operated terminals to secure port cargo 
(port concern) and space (carrier concern) are the main reasons for the specific North 
American situation.     
In Europe, the top six leading operators handled nearly 70 per cent of the total 
European container throughput in 2002 compared to 53 per cent in 1998, illustrating the 
mature and consolidated nature of this market (table 6). These figures are expected to rise 
as consolidation still continues and as the big players plan new massive terminals: PSA 
Corp. in Flushing, Antwerp and Sines, P&O Ports along the Thames (London Gateway 
project), Eurogate in Wilhelmshaven and HPH at Bathside Bay (Harwich - UK). The 
consolidation trend in European container handling leads to some controversy (Notteboom, 
2002). On the one hand, the extensive terminal networks are often considered as an 
effective means to counterbalance the power of carrier combinations in liner shipping, to 
realise economies of scale and to optimise the terminal function within logistics networks. 
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At the same time, however, the industry structure has become sufficiently concentrated to 
raise a fundamental question about whether market forces are sufficient to prevent the 
abuse of market power. EU competition regulations have already affected Hutchison's 
expansion within North Europe, and it is likely that any future moves by PSA Corp or 
P&O Ports will also be carefully scrutinised by the regulatory authorities. Regulatory 
bodies aim to encourage cost reductions and at the same time avoid the abuse of 
oligopolistic market powers.  
Table 6: Global terminal operators’ presence in the European container port system  
Note: figures include all terminals in which non-minority shareholdings were held. 
Source: based on terminal operator data and Drewry Shipping Consultants (2003)  
The response of the port sector to the shipping sector is inherently complementary to 
the changes in the shipping world. At the end a network of efficient seaports is needed, 
which for the sake of global welfare might lead to an efficient maritime transport system. 
This implies that both shipping lines and terminal operators parties should be in a position 
to work in similar working conditions. 
3.3 Integration along the supply chain 
Terminal operators are well aware of the fact that the transport chain is viewed as a totally 
integrated system. The leading terminal operating companies have developed diverging 
strategies towards the control of larger parts of the supply chain. 
The door-to-door philosophy has transformed a number of terminal operators into 
logistics organisations. The services offered include warehousing, distribution and low-end 
value-added logistical services (for example customising products for the local markets). 
The recent focus of Hutchison on inland logistics in China is an example. 
Worldwide 
throughput
2002
European 
throughput
2002
European 
throughput
1998
Annual growth 
Europe 98-02
Hutchison Port Holding (HPH) - China 36.70 6.90 7.75 -2.7%
Felixstowe (UK), Thamesport (UK), Harwich (UK), ECT-Rotterdam (the Netherlands)
PSA Corp - Singapore 26.20 5.44 0.60 201.7%
Voltri-Genoa (Italy), Sines (Portugal), VECON-Venice (Italy), 
HesseNoordNatie-Antwerp/Zeebrugge (Belgium)
APM Terminals - Denmark 17.20 3.24 1.00 56.0%
Bremerhaven (Germany), Rotterdam (the Netherlands), Algeciras (Spain), 
Gioia Tauro (Italy, 10% stake)
P&O Ports - UK 12.80 2.76 1.25 30.2%
Antwerp (Belgium), Marseille/Le Havre (France, joint-venture CMA-CGM), 
Southampton (UK), Tilbury (UK)
Eurogate - Germany 9.59 9.59 5.73 16.8%
Eurokai-Hamburg (Germany), BLG-Bremen (Germany), La Spezia (Italy), CICT-Cagliari (Italy)
Medcenter-Gioia Tauro (Italy), Liscont-Lisbon (Portugal), Livorno (Italy), Salerno (Italy)
HHLA - Germany 4.00 4.00 2.35 17.6%
Hamburg (Germany)
Total of six major European container terminals operating companies 106.49 31.93 18.68 17.7%
Grand total 275.00 46.50 35.06 8.2%
Share 6 operators in grand total 38.7% 68.7% 53.3%
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Especially German terminal operators are directly involved in intermodal rail transport 
(Notteboom, 2002). In recent years, Eurogate has been particularly successful in creating a 
European landbridge beween its German and Italian load centres. This Hannibal express, a 
north-south rail corridor that connects the intermodal services of subsidiary Sogemar in 
Italy to the shuttle network of boxexpress.de in Germany, offers carriers more flexibility in 
liner service design and transit times (Alberghini, 2002). Some terminal operators have set 
up road haulage companies or operate own feeder services. Finally, many terminal 
operators have integrated inland terminals in their logistics networks (see table 7 for the 
European case). These inland terminals in many cases serve as extended gates for deepsea 
terminals.  
ECT of Rotterdam operates a rail terminal in Venlo (since 1982) and trimodal terminals in Willebroek 
(TCT Belgium – since 1999) and Duisburg (also since 1999, (*)). ECT plans to build a barge terminal in 
Venlo (Venlo Barge Terminal). ECT, Rotterdam Municipal Port Management and the forwarding company 
Eurotrafo have a joint share of 53 per cent in a network of rail terminals in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia operated by CSKD-Intrans.  
Seaport Terminals/Katoen Natie has invested in an inland terminal network in the Benelux (for example in 
Wielsbeke and Terneuzen).  
The combination P&O Ports/Logport has developed a logistics zone and trimodal terminal on the site of 
Hafen Rheinhausen in Duisburg.  
Gerd Buss of Hamburg is an indirect shareholder of DCH (Düsseldorfer Container-Hafen).  
Unikai Hafenbetrieb, a subsidiary of HHLA (Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus) recently sold its river 
container terminals in Wörth (Middle Rhine) and Ottmarsheim (Upper Rhine) to Rhenus.  
CSX World Terminals is partner in the Rhine terminal CTG – Germersheim. 
Table 7: The involvement of terminal operators in north European inland terminals  
Note: (*) The ECT terminal in Duisburg  merged in 2001 with the neighbouring DeCeTe terminal. ECT has 
a stake of 27 per cent in the new terminal company that operates under the name DeCeTe. 
Source: Notteboom (2002) 
Not every terminal operator is integrating by acquiring or setting-up separate 
companies or business units. In many cases, an effective network integration is realised 
through better co-ordination with third-party transport operators or logistics service 
providers.  
4 Conclusions 
Shipping lines and terminal operators face increasingly turbulent, fast-changing and 
uncertain situations. The port and shipping markets are not stable any longer because the 
forces at work in the environment are rapidly changing. Technological advances, 
deregulation, logistics integration and associated new organisational structures, in 
particular, are constantly reshaping the port and maritime industries, and companies are 
busily trying to disrupt the status quo rather than preserve it.  
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Shipping lines have long believed to outperform rivals by deploying larger vessels. 
This unilateral focus on operational costs at sea proved to have its limitations. The essence 
of shipping lines’ existence is gradually shifting from pure shipping operations to 
integrated logistics solutions. Each carrier tries to give a meaningful answer to this 
paradigm shift. Through various forms of integration along the supply chain, shipping lines 
are trying to generate revenue, to streamline sea, port and land operations and to create 
customer value. For the time being, container terminal operators are mainly focused on 
increasing the scale of operations. Global terminal operators clearly have shifted their 
mindset from a local port level to a port network level, albeit that the terminal network 
effects still have to be exploited to the full. There even exist evidence of increasing 
logistics integration with inland terminals, hinterland transportation and broader logistics 
services. Also here, the paradigm shift is at the core of operators’ refocusing.  
Individual terminal operators and shipping lines might walk different paths on a quest 
for higher margins and increased customer satisfaction. And more than once they change 
paths as the bases of competitiveness in the highly competitive markets are likely to erode 
sooner or later. Port and maritime companies try to sustain a competitive edge by building 
barriers to prevent competitors from entering their domains. New entrants seek to minimise 
these kinds of entry barriers, for example by entering from a contiguous market in which 
they have already gained some knowledge and experience, or entering on a small scale. As 
such, bases of competitiveness are likely to escalate in the port and maritime industries as 
companies seek to make different market moves, for example by entering new markets or 
building strongholds in existing markets, and building different barriers. 
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